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Abstract
We extend the results of Goyal and Joshi (S. Goyal and S. Joshi. Networks of
collaboration in oligopoly. Games and Economic behavior, 43(1):57-85, 2003), who
first considered the problem of collaboration networks of oligopolies and showed that
under certain linear assumptions network collaboration produced a stable complete
graph through selfish competition. We show with nonlinear cost functions and player
payoff alteration that stable collaboration graphs with an arbitrary degree sequence
can result. As a by product, we prove a general result on the formation of graphs
with arbitrary degree sequences as the result of selfish competition. Simple motivating
examples are provided and we discuss a potential relation to Network Science in our
conclusions.
1 Introduction
In this paper we model the emergence of collaborations among players (e.g., firms) as a
strategic network formation game [DM97], by allowing selfish agents to choose with which
other agents they would like to form a link. Each agent has the option to deny a link to
another agent, so the formation of a link requires the cooperation of both players. A value
function assigns a value to each particular graph and this value is distributed to agents
by an allocation function (or allocation rule). This distribution of value drives a player’s
preference for particular graph structures. The primary objective of this paper is to extend
and generalize a model by Goyal and Joshi [GJ03] for collaboration of oligopolistic firms to
provide a model that, under different conditions, admits a stable collaboration graph with
symmetric or asymmetric degree distributions. The primary contribution of this work is
showing that nonlinear pricing and collaboration incentives exist to create arbitrary stable
network structures. This extends the work of Goyal and Joshi who showed that linear pricing
schemes lead to stable graphs that are complete only. Thus the occurrence of exotic graphs
(e.g., power law graphs) in natural collaborations may simply be the result of nonlinear
incentives.
In particular circumstances a modeler may wish to predict how a network will change if
it is perturbed in some way. Specifically, a network may be changed by a player entering
or exiting the game or when a link is added or deleted. For example, Verizon might be
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interested in knowing if AT&T and T-Mobile merged, whether the new network would be
stable and how the merger might affect the market. Models that take a statistical in nature
provide forecasts for the behavior of large networks, since bulk measures are used, but have
difficulty predicting the stability of smaller network of interest. Unfortunately, the models
developed in this paper also have some limitations in that they require some knowledge of the
objective functions of players. Further, the models developed in this paper are static models
which provide insight into the stability of particular networks, but predictive capabilities may
require a dynamic model of objective functions. These two limitations are discussed further
in Section 6 and are the driving motivation of continued work in this area. Nonetheless, the
models developed in this paper provide a foundation to develop modeling approaches that
can predict the reaction of networks to specific changes that may take place.
The research on network formation games is extensive. We summarize a few key results
germane to our presentation. Myerson [Mye77] considers cooperation structures, which we
call graphs, but he considers only whether agents are connected, not the structure of the
graph of connections. Nonetheless, Myerson was the first to consider the strategic formation
of networks.
Jackson and Wolinsky model social relationships where each player receives benefits at
a cost from their friends and a lower benefit from friends of friends, but with no cost.
Jackson and Wolinsky investigate network formation via the stability of particular graph
structures [JW96]. An efficient graph structure is one with the maximum value, that is, the
total value of all agents is maximized (see Section 2 for a mathematical definition). Jackson
and Wolinksy found that efficient graph structures are not always stable, but their analysis
used pairwise stability (see Section 2), which restricts the capabilities of agents and assumes
a symmetric allocation rule.
Dutta and Mutuswami construct an allocation rule that ensures the existence of a strongly
stable efficient graph where the allocation rule is symmetric on this subset of strongly stable
graphs [DM97]. Bala and Goyal [BG00] consider a model where links allow access to a
noncompetitive product such as information. The cost of a link is attributed to the agent
initiating the formation of the link.
Furusawa and Konishi [FK07] model free trade networks in which a link between countries
represents a free trade agreement and the absence of a link results in a tariff. The supply
and demand functions then induce a value function and allocation rules over the countries.
Belleflamme and Bloch [BB04] model market sharing between firms where a link between
two firms represents an agreement not to infringe on each other’s market and the absence of
a link implies the firms will compete in the same market. Again, supply and demand induce
a value function and an allocation rule over the firms. Labor markets [CAJ07] and co-author
networks [JW96] have also been modeled using game theoretic networks.
Networks allow a model to portray intricate relationships among players that cannot
otherwise be described. For example, non-transitive relationships may be modeled as in the
case when (e.g.), Player 1 is connected to Players 2 and 3, but Players 2 and 3 are not
connected to one another. This generality leads to another important aspect of a network
model: how do relationships of one pair of players affect a third player? In some cases, a
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positive benefit may be reaped by an outside party; other times, a negative affect may be
imposed on an outside party. Networks allow relationships to be modeled as an externality
for outside players, but the nature of the externality is dependent on the application and the
model. Currarini [Cur02] investigates the nature of externalities in networks by modeling
the value of a graph as a function of the components of the graph. Particularly, any graph is
partitioned into one or more components and the value may be a function of the partition.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we provide notation
used throughout the remainder of this paper. In Section 3 we state and prove a general
result on game theoretic constructions of graphs with arbitrary degree sequences. In Section
4 we apply this result to extend the work of Goyal and Joshi [GJ03] and provide the main
results of the paper. In Section 5 we provide conclusions and suggest a bridge between this
work and recent work in Network Science. Finally in Section 6 we discuss future directions
of this research as well as new research directions that would make this work more applicable
to the analysis of real-world organizations.
2 Notational Preliminaries
We follow the notational conventions common in the graph formation literature [JW96,
DM97,Jac03]. Let N = {1, 2, . . . n} be the set of nodes in a graph, which will represent the
players. In the case of oligopolies, a firm is considered a player. The set of links in the graph
is a set of pairs of nodes (subsets of N of size two). A graph g is a set of links (set of subsets
of N of size two). The graph gc is the complete graph (all subsets of N of size two) and G is
the set of all graphs over the node set N , that is, G = {g : g ⊆ gc}. For a graph g ∈ G, the
graph g+ ij is the graph in which link ij is added to g while g− ij is the graph in which link
ij is removed from graph g. Let ηi(g) : G → R denote the degree of node i in graph g and
η(g) : G → Rn be the degree sequence of the graph g; i.e., η(g) = (η1(g), η2(g), . . . , ηn(g)).
Let [g]η be the equivalence class of graphs with the same degree sequence as g. A degree
sequence d = {d1, . . . , dn} on n nodes is graphical, if there exists a graph g with n nodes
that has degree sequence d. Equivalently, a degree sequence d is graphical if η−1(d) 6= ∅.
The value of a graph g is the total value produced by agents in the graph; we denote the
value of a graph as the function v : G → R and the set of all such value functions as V . A
graph g is strongly efficient if v(g) ≥ v(g′) ∀ g′ ∈ G. An allocation rule Y : V × G → RN
distributes the value v(g) among the agents in g. Denote the value allocated to agent i as
Yi(v, g). Since, the allocation rule must distribute the value of the network to all players, it
must be balanced ; i.e.,
∑
i Yi(v, g) = v(g) for all (v, g) ∈ V ×G. The allocation rule governs
how the value of the graph is distributed and thus plays a significant role in the model. The
allocation rule may be used to model a free market, utilities of players, or system rules such
as taxation or the provision of subsidies to particular players. Throughout this paper, we
denote the game G = G(v, Y,N) as the game played with value function v and allocation
rule Y over nodes N .
The strategy set of Player i, Si, is the set of nodes to which Player i may request to link
and S =
∏
i∈N Si is the strategy space for all players. The graph g induced by strategy s ∈ S
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is g(s) = {ij : j ∈ si, i ∈ sj}. Here si ∈ Si is the strategy for Player i in the overall strategy
s.
The payoff of Player i is defined as fGi (s) = Yi(v, g(s)). This is interpreted as the payoff
that player i receives from the strategy s in game G and is the proportion of the value v(g(s))
distributed by Y . This model admits a Nash equilibrium in which each player chooses to link
with no other players and no network forms. Various authors argue that this is an inadequacy
and therefore it is necessary to make refinements to the notion of equilibrium [Jac03,DM97].
Jackson and Wolinksy use pairwise stability to model stable networks without the use of
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium [JW96].
Definition 2.1. A network g with value function v and allocation rule Y is pairwise stable
if (and only if):
1. for all ij ∈ g, Yi(v, g) ≥ Yi(v, g − ij) and
2. for all ij 6∈ g, if Yi(v, g + ij) > Yi(v, g), then Yj(v, g + ij) < Yj(v, g)
Pairwise stability implies that in a stable network, for each link that exists, (1) both
players must benefit from it and (2) if a link can provide benefit to both players, then it
in fact must exist. Jackson notes that pairwise stability may be too weak because it does
not allow groups of players to add or delete links, only pairs of players [Jac03]. Deletion of
multiple links simultaneously has been considered in [BB04].
Goyal and Joshi [GJ06] provide a model that allows a player’s allocation to be dependent
on the number of links the player has. That is:
Yi(g) = pii(g)− γηi(g) (1)
Here pii is a profit function, ηi(g) is the number of links player i has in g, and γ is a link
maintenance cost. However, γ may be negative to model a benefit of having more links. The
value function is then defined implicitly so that Yi(g) is a balanced allocation rule.
3 A General Result on Graph Stability
In this section, we show how to construct an allocation rule Yi(g) to ensure that a graph with
a given degree sequence is stable. To do this, we present a set of properties for the objectives
of players that result in a stable graph with an arbitrary degree sequence. Recall, a stable
network is one in which no player has an incentive to drop a link or request an additional link
to a player who reciprocates such an incentive. Consider the scenario where for i = 1, . . . , n,
Player i has a desired degree ki. For example, some scientific authors may like to collaborate
with only a few individuals, while some like to collaborate with many others. Ultimately,
when a collaboration network is formed, each player i receives the number of links given
by ηi(g). In the game where each player’s objective penalizes them for incurring a degree
ηi(g) not equal to their desired degree ki (under some conditions), the graph with a degree
distribution of k = (k1, k2, . . . , kn) will be stable.
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With a slight abuse of the notation from Section 2, we first define an allocation (payoff)
to each player i as Yi : G→ R which is consistent with an allocation function Y : G×V → R
and an induced value function V : G→ R with v(g) =
∑
i Yi(g).
Theorem 3.1. Let d = (k1, . . . , kn) be a desired degree sequence for n players in the node set
N . Assume that Player i wishes to maximize objective Yi(g) = −fi(ηi(g)) = −f(ηi(g)− ki)
(or minimize fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g)−ki)), where f : R→ R is a convex function with minimum
at 0. Let v be the balanced value function induced from the allocation rule Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn).
If η−1(d) is non-empty (i.e., d is graphic) then any graph g such that η(g) = d is pairwise
stable for the the game G(v, Y,N).
Proof. Let g ∈ η−1(d) be a graph so that ηi(g) = ki and let g − ij be the graph g after the
link ij is dropped from g and define g + ij to be the graph g after the link ij is added to
graph g. Observe that:
ηi(g − ij) = ki − 1, ηj(g − ij) = kj − 1, ηl(g − ij) = kl,
ηi(g + ij) = ki + 1, ηj(g + ij) = kj + 1, ηl(g + ij) = kl
where l 6∈ {i, j}
Since f is convex with minimum at 0 and each fi are simply shifts of f so that they
are minimized at ki, we know that fi(ki) is a minimum of the function fi. Thus Yi(g) is
maximized when g ∈ η−1(d). It now suffices to confirm pairwise stability:
Yi(ηi(g − ij))− Yi(ηi(g)) = Yi(ki − 1)− Yi(ki) < 0
Yi(ηi(g + ij))− Yi(ηi(g)) = Yi(ki + 1)− Yi(ki) < 0
Thus graph g ∈ η(d) is stable because there is no firm i willing to drop an arbitrary existing
link ij or add an arbitrary missing link ij.
Remark 3.2. From Theorem 3.1 it is interesting to note that the stability of the class η−1(d)
is not unique. We can illustrate this fact using the following counterexample. Let d =
(1, 1, 1, 2, 3) with N = {1, . . . , 5} and let f(x) = x2, a simple convex function with minimum
at zero, from the theorem. The following two networks are both pairwise stable solutions to
the game G = (v, Y,N): It should be clear however, that the second graph is not a Pareto
optimal solution to the problem. Pareto optimality of the class of graphs η−1(d) follows a
posteriori from the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.3. Assume the conditions from Theorem 3.1. A graph g is a pairwise stable
and Pareto optimal solution to the game G(v, Y,N) if and only if η(g) = d.
Proof. The fact that d is graphic implies that there is some graph g ∈ η−1(g) and furthermore
Yi(g) is maximized for all i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore any change in strategy cannot improve any
player’s current payoff. Thus, g is Pareto optimal and pairwise stable.
If g′ 6∈ η−1(d) then while g′ may be pairwise stable, it cannot be Pareto optimal since
there is some other graph g ∈ η−1(d) so that Yi(g) > Yi(g
′) for some i ∈ N .
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Stable with correct degree distribution Stable with incorrect degree distribution
since only one node wants to change.
Figure 1: We illustrate two graphs that are both pairwise stable for degree sequence d =
(1, 1, 1, 2, 3) with f(x) = x2 in Theorem 3.1
.
Example 3.4. Suppose that we want the degree distribution of a stable graph that results
from playing the game described in Theorem 3.1 to have a power law degree distribution.
We embed this into the objectives of the players, so the resulting graph has the proper
distribution. Let N = 100 players attempt to minimize their cost function
f(ηi(g)) = (ηi(g)− ki)
2 + ψ
where ψ = 2 and the parameters of each player (ki) are given in the following table:
Node(s) ki
1-75 1
76-89 2
90-94 3
95-96 4
97 5
98 6
99 7
100 8
The distribution of values of ki forms an approximate (with rounding to integers) power law
distribution. This is illustrated in Figure 2:
Figure 3 illustrates one realization of a power law graph with the desired degree distri-
bution. We can test the stability of any graph g with ηi(g) = ki. In doing so, we observe
that any graph with this distribution must be both stable (since there is no motivation for
any player to alter her configuration within the network) and Pareto optimal.
We can experimentally analyze this simple game to determine the nature of the average
network produced during play. For a simple experiment, 100 pairwise stable graphs were
generated and some of their properties analyzed. To build these pairwise stable graphs, we
used the following procedure:
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Figure 2: The empirical desired distribution of the degrees of the players. This degree
distribution follows an approximate power law distribution.
1. An empty graph was initialized.
2. Two vertices that had degree less than their desired degree were chosen at random
without replacement.
3. These two vertices were joined by an edge.
4. The graph was checked for pairwise stability. If the graph was pairwise stable, the
graph was returned. Otherwise, we continued at Step 2.
Results are shown in Figure 4. The left histogram shows the similarity between the degree
specified degree distribution and the mean degree distribution of the ensemble of graphs
generated. A more interesting plot is the mean objective function value on a per-player
basis (with error bars). This graph indicates that most players successfully minimize their
objective value (to zero) and that the players with the worst ability to optimize their objective
functions are players with high degree requirements. It is interesting to note that these results
are a function of the routine used to compute pairwise stable graphs. We also tried using a
modified version of the preferential attachment algorithm:
1. An empty graph was initialized.
2. Two vertices that had degree less than their desired degree and with highest desired
degree where chosen at random.
3. These two vertices were joined by an edge.
4. The graph was checked for pairwise stability. If the graph was pairwise stable, the
graph was returned. Otherwise, we continued at Step 2.
Using this algorithm, in 100 simulation runs a graph with the proscribed degree sequence
was always returned1.
1Maple code for these experiments is available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 3: Sample pairwise stable collaboration Network for 100 nodes.
4 Application to Collaboration in Oligopoly
We present an application of the network formation game to firm collaboration in oligopolies,
which is an extension to the firm collaboration presented by Goyal and Joshi in [GJ03]. We
show the conditions under which a firm collaboration network with an arbitrary degree
sequence will be stable.
The number of firms participating in collaborative agreements (e.g., sharing resources
such as equipment, laboratory space, office space, engineers and scientists through separate
R & D subcompanies) has significantly increased within industries that are R & D intensive
[HS90,Hag93,HS94,Hag96,HLV00,Hag02], sparking research investigating the incentives for
such collaboration.
Goyal and Joshi examine the incentives for collaboration and the interaction of these
incentives under market competition using a model of horizontal oligopolistic firm collabora-
tion. In this model, firms compete in the market after choosing collaborators [GJ03]. Goyal
and Joshi provide theoretical analysis on various models with varying levels of link forma-
tion costs relative to production costs. They assume that collaboration requires a fixed cost
from each firm. These models investigate collaboration agreements where the collaboration
reduces the cost of production. This prior work assumes a constant return to scale cost
function, which they admit is a restrictive assumption, although it has been made by others
in the collaborative R & D literature [Blo95].
4.1 Previous Results on Network Stability in Oligopoly
Following [GJ03], consider an oligopoly composed of n firms, each of whom may collaborate
with any of the other n− 1 firms. Firm i produces a quantity qi of a product. Collaboration
among firms affects the marginal cost of production. Thus a particular (collaboration) graph
g induces a marginal cost vector c(g) ∈ Rn in which ci(g) is the marginal cost of firm i under
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Experimental results from 100 pairwise stable graphs that result when the given
degree distribution is used with the objective f(ηi(g)) = (ηi(g)− ki)
2 + ψ.
collaboration graph g. It is assumed that the marginal cost decreases for a firm i as the
number of collaborators increase. For many of the models in [GJ03], it is assumed that the
marginal cost of firm i linearly decreases with the number of collaborators for firm i:
ci(g) = γ0 − γηi(g) (2)
where, as before, ηi(g) is the number of links for firm i and γ0 is the marginal cost of
production when a firm has no links. Notice that γ0 is constant for all firms. Given a
network g, there is an induced set of costs which, along with the demand functions, produces
a set of profit functions for each firm, Yi(g) (the allocation of payoff for player i). These
profit functions then induce a Nash equilibrium of production, which provides the precise
allocation rule (i.e., profit) for each firm on the graph. The stability of the collaboration
network can then be analyzed as in Section 3.
One example that Goyal and Joshi [GJ03] study is that of a homogenous product
oligopoly. The market marginal price function (dependent on quantity produced) is given
by
P (Q) = α−
∑
i∈N
qi (3)
where Q =
∑
i∈N qi. Using Equation 2, the resulting profit to Player i is:
Yi(g) =
(
α−
∑
i∈N
qi
)
qi − (γ0 − γηi(g)) qi = (α− γ0)qi −
(∑
i∈N
qi
)
qi − (−γηi(g)) qi (4)
Given a collaboration network g and marginal cost and demand induced by network g
we can use Expression 4 to find the quantity produced by each firm at Cournot equilibrium
using the standard Cournot oligopoly production formulation [Tri88,GJ03]:
qi =
α− γ0 + nγηi(g)− γ
∑
j 6=i ηj(g)
n+ 1
(5)
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The fact that qi is a function of the collaboration graph g implies that the quantities: P , Q
and ci are all functions of g. We will refer to these quantities in this way in the sequel.
There is no natural market force in this model to ensure that a firm does not produce a
negative quantity. Instead, Goyal and Joshi restrict the parameters by looking at the case
where firm i has no collaborators (ηi(g) = 0) and all others have a maximum number of
collaborators (ηj(g) = n − 2 for all j 6= i) and forcing the quantity production to remain
non-negative; i.e.:
α− γ0 − γ(n− 1)(n− 2) ≥ 0 (6)
Goyal and Joshi show that with marginal cost (2) and market demand (3), the complete
network is the unique stable network [GJ03]. They point out that the positive contribution
to profit obtained by a collaboration link is on the order of nγ and the negative contribution
to profit is on the order of γ, so the net profit is on the order of (n − 1)γ, which leads to a
firm’s incentive to saturate all of its possible links, thus making the complete graph stable.
Example 4.1. We present a numerical example of the result from [GJ03]. Let N = 5 firms
compete in an oligopoly with inverse demand function P = 100−Q, fixed cost γ0 = 5, and
γ = 1. Then we can see that:
α− γ0 − γ(n− 1)(n− 2) = 100− 5− (4)(3) = 95− 12 = 83 > 0 (7)
This enforces the non-negativity of production. Since the marginal cost of Player i (i =
1, . . . , 5) decreases as its degree increases (from Equation 2) it is easy to see that players will
prefer as many links as possible. Thus, the complete graph must be stable.
Remark 4.2. The fundamental limitation to Goyal and Joshi’s work lies in the model complex-
ity. Maintaining collaborations is costly and each additional collaboration may contribute
less to the marginal cost than the collaboration before it. Additionally, Goyal and Joshi’s
model admits only complete collaboration networks, omitting any other type of collaboration
network. The remainder of the paper illustrates how to generalize this result to graphs with
arbitrary degree sequences.
4.2 Results of Nonlinear Cost on Stability
In this section we study the effect a nonlinear variation on the marginal cost function has
on the stability of collaboration structures. We consider a marginal cost function:
ci(g) = γ0 + fi(ηi(g)) (8)
where fi is some function fi : R→ R. We present two Theorems:
1. Theorem 4.11 extends the results from Goyal and Joshi [GJ03] to the case where
firms receive decreasing marginal benefit from collaboration via a nonlinear decrease
in production cost. This extension allows the parameter space to be considerably less
restricted than the result in [GJ03].
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2. Theorem 4.7 shows that if the functions fi have minima and the parameter space is
restricted to keep production quantities nonnegative, then the collaboration network
in the oligopolistic competition model will have a graph corresponding to the arbitrary
degree sequence in the prior section.
As a result, this is a particular application of Theorem 3.1, to a general collaboration game.
To prove our theorems, we alter the assumptions on the functions fi from the marginal cost
(Expression 8). Theorem 4.7 requires convex functions fi where as Theorem 4.11 requires fi
to be a decreasing and convex function.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose we have an oligopoly consisting of n firms in which collaboration is
defined by the graph g and the profit function (allocation rule) for Firm i in that oligopoly is
given by:
Yi(g, q(g)) = (α− γ0)qi(g)−
(∑
j∈N
qj
)
qi(g)− (fi(ηi(g)))qi(g) (9)
then the quantity produced for firm i is:
qi(g) =
α− γ0 − nfi(ηi(g)) +
∑
j 6=i fj(ηj(g))
n+ 1
(10)
Proof. From [Tri88], for any oligopoly with profit function of the form:
Yi(q) = aqi −
(∑
j∈N
qj
)
qi − biqi (11)
The resulting Cournot equilibrium point on quantities is:
qi =
a− nbi +
∑
j 6=i bj
n+ 1
(12)
In our case, we have:
a = α− γ0
bi = fi(ηi(g)) ∀i
Substituting these definitions into Expression (12) yields Expression (10). This completes
the proof.
Remark 4.4. It is worth noting that when for each firm i, bi = −γηi(g) then the cost function
(2) and induced equilibrium quantity (5) is retrieved from Goyal and Joshi.
Corollary 4.5. Suppose that f is a convex function that has a minimum at 0. Further,
suppose fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g) − ki) where ki ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}. If the parameters α and γ0
and the function f are such that:
α− γ0 − nmax(f(n− 1), f(1− n))−
1
2
(n− 1)max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) > 0 (13)
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and n ≥ 2, then the Cournot equilibrium point quantities (10) are nonnegative for all firms
and for all collaboration graphs and the two inequalities are true:
2qi(g)−
n− 1
n+ 1
[f(1)− f(0)] > 0 (14)
2qi(g)−
n− 1
n+ 1
[f(−1)− f(0)] > 0 (15)
Proof. Since n ≥ 2 and f is convex and has a minimum at 0, this implies that n−1
n+1
[f(1)−f(0)]
and n−1
n+1
[f(−1)−f(0)] are non-negative. Hence, (14) and (15) imply that qi(g) is non-negative
and hence it suffices to only show that (14) and (15) are implied by (13).
For all i, function fi is a convex function of the degree of node i in the graph g; the
degree of node i must take an integer value between 0 and n− 1, which due to the convexity
of fi and the fact that ki ∈ {1, 2, . . . n− 1} implies that the maximum of fi is equivalent to
max(f(n− 1), f(−n+ 1)). That is,
fi(ηi(g)) ≤ max(f(n− 1), f(−n+ 1))
This means that (13) implies:
α− γ0 − nfi(ηi(g))−
1
2
(n− 1)max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) > 0 ∀i (16)
Since, all fi(ηi(g)) ≥ 0, we may add
∑
j 6=i fj(ηj(g)) to the left side of (16) without harming
the inequality, implying:
α− γ0− nfi(ηi(g)) +
∑
j 6=i
fj(ηj(g))−
1
2
(n− 1)max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) > 0 ∀i (17)
Now we divide by n + 1:
α− γ0 − nfi(ηi(g)) +
∑
j 6=i fj(ηj(g))
n+ 1
−
1
2
n− 1
n+ 1
max(f(1)−f(0), f(−1)−f(0)) > 0 ∀i (18)
The term on the left of (18) is qi(g):
qi(g)−
1
2
n− 1
n + 1
max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) > 0 ∀i (19)
Multiply through by two and note:
2qi(g) >
n− 1
n+ 1
max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) >
n− 1
n+ 1
[f(1)− f(0)] ∀i
2qi(g) >
n− 1
n+ 1
max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) >
n− 1
n+ 1
[f(−1)− f(0)] ∀i
Now (14) and (15) immediately follow.
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Remark 4.6. This essentially means that the steeper a function f around zero and on the
interval (−n + 1, n − 1), the greater the quantity α − γ0 is needed to ensure the theorem
proved later in this section. It is worth pointing out that this bound may often not be tight
(i.e., the inequalities may hold true and production quantities may be positive even when
the condition is not not met).
Theorem 4.7. Suppose that f is a convex function that has a minimum at 0. Further,
suppose fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g)− ki). Define the change in f as △
−fi(ki) = fi(ki− 1)− fi(ki) =
f(−1)−f(0) = △−f(0) and △+fi(ki) = fi(ki+1)−fi(ki) = f(1)−f(0) = △
+f(0). Suppose
n ≥ 2 firms compete in an oligopoly with market demand p = α−
∑
i∈N qi and marginal costs
ci(g) = γ0 + fi(ηi(g)). If the parameters α and γ0 and the function f obey condition (13),
then the equivalence class of graphs [g]η such that ηi(g) = ki is an equivalence class of stable
collaboration graphs.
Proof. Let g be a graph g such that ηi(g) = ki for all firms i. Consider a firm i who may
consider dropping its link with node j. If node i drops its link with node j leading to graph
g − ij, then ηi(g − ij) = ki − 1 and ηj(g − ij) = kj − 1, while ηr(g − ij) = kr for r 6∈ {i, j}.
Using Lemma 4.3
qi =
α− γ0 − nfi(ηi(g)) +
∑
j 6=i∈N fj(ηj(g))
n+ 1
(20)
Calculate:
qi(g − ij) = qi(g)−△
−fi(ki)
(
n
n + 1
)
+△−fj(kj)
(
1
n + 1
)
qj(g − ij) = qj(g)−△
−fj(kj)
(
n
n + 1
)
+△−fi(ki)
(
1
n+ 1
)
qr(g − ij) = qr(g) +△
−fi(ki)
(
1
n+ 1
)
+△−fj(kj)
(
1
n + 1
)
It then follows that
Q(g − ij) = Q(g)−
(
1
n+ 1
)
(△−fi(ki) +△
−fj(kj))
P (g − ij) = P (g) +
(
1
n+ 1
)
(△−fi(ki) +△
−fj(kj))
ci(g − ij) = ci(g) +△
−fi(ki)
Now, we can calculate Yi(g − ij) in terms of Yi(g):
Yi(g − ij) = qi(g − ij)[P (g − ij)− ci(g − ij)]
= Yi(g) + qi(g)
(
2
n+ 1
)
[△−fj(kj)− n△
−fi(ki)] +
(
[△−fj(kj)− n△
−fi(ki)]
n + 1
)2
Since fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g) − ki) this implies that △
−fi(ki) = △
−fj(kj) leading to (21) and
then (22) and (23) through algebraic manipulation. Finally, by the assumptions of the
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theorem and condition (13) each of the quantities △−fi(ki),
n−1
n+1
, and 2qi(g)−
n−1
n+1
△−fi(ki)
are nonnegative implying (24).
Yi(g − ij)− Yi(g) = 2qi(g)△
−fi(ki)
(
1− n
n+ 1
)
+ (△−fi(ki))
2
(
1− n
n+ 1
)2
(21)
= △−fi(ki)
(
1− n
n+ 1
)(
2qi(g) +
1− n
n+ 1
△−fi(ki)
)
(22)
= −△−fi(ki)
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)(
2qi(g)−
n− 1
n+ 1
△−fi(ki)
)
(23)
< 0 (24)
This implies that if firm i attempts to drop link ij, then Yi(g) > Yi(g − ij) and thus firm
i decreases its profit. The same will be true for firm j. Hence, no firm has an incentive to
drop a link from graph g. Now, we will consider the case where firm i attempts to add a link
to the graph g, giving g + ij under the assumption that the link ij does not exist in graph
g. This analysis will follow closely the analysis for g − ij. First note that ηi(g) = ki for all
firms i and ηi(g+ ij) = ki+1 and ηj(g+ ij) = kj+1, while ηr(g+ ij) = kr for r 6∈ {i, j}. We
define △+fi(ki) as △
+fi(ki) = fi(k+1)−fi(k); note the subtle difference from the definition
of △−fi(ki). Again using Lemma 4.3, we calculate the production quantity for each node in
graph g + ij:
qi(g + ij) = qi(g)−△
+fi(ki)
(
n
n+ 1
)
+△+fj(kj)
(
1
n + 1
)
qj(g + ij) = qj(g)−△
+fj(kj)
(
n
n+ 1
)
+△+fi(ki)
(
1
n+ 1
)
qr(g + ij) = qr(g) +△
+fi(ki)
(
1
n+ 1
)
+△+fj(kj)
(
1
n+ 1
)
We can then calculate the corresponding total production quantity Q, the market price P
and marginal costs for each player for the graph g + ij:
Q(g + ij) = Q(g)−
(
1
n+ 1
)
(△+fi(ki) +△
+fj(kj))
P (g + ij) = P (g) +
(
1
n + 1
)
(△+fi(ki) +△
+fj(kj))
ci(g + ij) = ci(g) +△
+fi(ki)
Now, we can calculate Yi(g + ij) in terms of Yi(g):
Yi(g + ij) = qi(g + ij)[P (g + ij)− ci(g + ij)]
= Yi(g) + qi(g)
(
2
n + 1
)
[△+fj(kj)− n△
+fi(ki)] +
(
[△+fj(kj)− n△
+fi(ki)]
n + 1
)2
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Since fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g) − ki) this implies that △
+fi(ki) = △
+fj(kj) leading to (25) and
then (26) and (27) through algebraic manipulation. Finally, by the assumptions of the
theorem and condition (13), each of the quantities △+fi(ki),
n−1
n+1
, and 2qi(g)−
n−1
n+1
△+fi(ki)
are positive implying (28).
Yi(g + ij)− Yi(g) = 2qi(g)△
+fi(ki)
(
1− n
n+ 1
)
+ (△+fi(ki))
2
(
1− n
n+ 1
)2
(25)
= △+fi(ki)
(
1− n
n + 1
)(
2qi(g) +
1− n
n+ 1
△+fi(ki)
)
(26)
= −△+fi(ki)
(
n− 1
n+ 1
)(
2qi(g)−
n− 1
n+ 1
△+fi(ki)
)
(27)
< 0 (28)
This implies that if firm i attempts to add a link ij, then Yi(g) > Yi(g + ij) and the firm
decreases its profit. The same will be true for firm j. Hence, no firm has an incentive to
add a link to graph g. Since no firm has an incentive to add or drop a link to graph g, it is
stable. This completes the proof.
Example 4.8. We present a numerical example of Theorem 4.7. Let N = 5 firms compete in
an oligopoly with inverse demand function P = 100 − Q, fixed cost γ0 = 5, and f(η(g)) =
(η(g))2 + ψ where ψ = 2. Each firm has the shifted function fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g) − ki) =
(ηi(g) − ki)
2 + ψ where k = [2, 3, 4, 3, 2]T and . We want to test the stability of a graph g
with ηi(g) = ki and fi(ηi(g)) = (ηi(g)− ki)
2 + ψ for each node i. In order to apply theorem
(4.7), we must ensure condition (13) is met. We calculate:
f(−n + 1) = f(−4) = 18, f(−1) = 3, f(0) = 2,
f(1) = 3, f(n− 1) = f(4) = 18,
Hence,
max(f(n− 1), f(1− n)) = 18, max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) = 1,
nmax(f(n− 1), f(1− n)) = 5 · 18 = 90, (n− 1)max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) = 4 · 1 = 4,
α− γ0 − nmax(f(n− 1), f(1− n))−
1
2
(n− 1)max(f(1)− f(0), f(−1)− f(0)) =
100− 5− 90−
1
2
· 4 = 3 > 0
Two stable isomorphic graphs, shown in Figure 5, have a degree sequence equivalent to k.
However, for the given parameters, there are 33 stable graphs of which only the two shown
have degree sequence equal to k. These graphs were computed using Maple and are shown
in Figure 6. It is interesting to investigate the other stable networks with degree sequences
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Figure 5: Two stable and isomorphic graphs that are possible configurations for collaboration
in the example oligopoly.
Figure 6: The 29 stable graphs that arise from the parameters given.
16
different from k. The graph in Row 7, Column 2 of Figure 6 shows a stable configuration
where both nodes 3 and 4 would prefer one more link, but they are already linked together
and no other node requires an additional link. Hence, the network is stable because each
node is either satisfied or no pair of nodes can bilaterally improve themselves through the
addition or removal of a link. It is interesting to note that in the case of the graph shown, if
both nodes 1 and 5, were to give up their link with one another and instead link to nodes 4
and 3 respectively, then each node would have minimized its marginal costs. While it is the
case that nodes 1 and 5 would not benefit from such a trade that would help nodes 3 and 4.
These nodes would indirectly hurt themselves via the decreased market price as a result of
the additional quantity produced by nodes 3 and 4. Nonetheless this analysis brings out the
fact that the manner in which nodes link to one another and the manner in which stability
is analyzed, greatly affects which networks are deemed to be stable.
Example 4.9. For small numbers of firms < 7 generating the set of stable graphs takes
seconds (even in an interpreted language like Maple). Consider the case of a firm (in this
case Firm 3) who determines that collaboration is desired, but recognizes there may be a
sink cost (not included in the model) associated with initializing such a collaboration. For
example, the time taken to establish industry connections will cost in terms of human labor.
Assuming Firm 3 is a selfish profit maximizer and assumes that all other firms are selfish
profit maximizers who will play to a stable configuration, then the analysis of the potentially
stable graphs will inform Firm 3 on the potential payoffs it might receive. If the network is
already in a stable configuration, then since there are three stable configurations in which
Firm 3 is not connected to any other players, then it may not be worthwhile to even explore
collaboration. On the other hand, if there is no collaboration (an unstable condition), then
Firm 3 may hope to steer the network evolution and will evaluate its various payoffs in each
possible stable configuration. The possible payoffs are shown in Figure 7: Note that there is
a substantial variation in the payoff the Player 3 may receive. In the empty graph, Player
3 receives a payoff of 169/4. Notice that some collaborative scenarios disadvantage Player 3
(3 of the 33) while most improve Player 3’s payoff.
Remark 4.10. Goyal and Joshi show that in a market with homogenous products and under
quantity competition, the uniquely stable network is the complete network for specific cost
functions under some parameter restrictions [GJ03]. Theorem 4.11 extends the result in
Goyal and Joshi [GJ03] by using nonlinear costs and decreasing the restriction on parameters
necessary for the model to be feasible.
Theorem 4.11. Suppose the marginal cost for firm i on graph g is ci(g) = γ0 + f(ηi(g)).
Define △f(k) = f(k + 1) − f(k). Further suppose each firm reduces its marginal cost
for each additional collaboration (Condition (1)), the collaboration cost reduction function
f is convex (Condition (2)), collaboration cost reduction function f is positive (Condition
(3)), the production quantity is positive (Condition (4)), and the collaboration cost reduction
function f is not too steep (Condition (5)):
1. x1 > x2 implies f(x1) < f(x2);
17
Figure 7: The possible payoffs Player 3 can obtain in the various stable configurations. From
Figure 6, graphs are numbered from left-to-right, top-to-bottom.
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2. f is convex;
3. f is positive;
4. α− γ0 > nf(0); and
5. △f(k1)− n△f(k2) > 0 for all k1, k2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . n− 1}
Then the complete network gc is a stable graph.
Proof. The production quantity and profit can be calculated as before in (10) and (9),
respectively, by using that fact that fi = f for all i.
qi(g) =
α− γ0 − nf(ηi(g)) +
∑
j 6=i∈N f(ηj(g))
n+ 1
Yi(g) = qi(g) (P (Q)− ci(g)) = qi(g)
(
α−
(∑
j
qj(g)
)
− γ0 − f(ηi(g))
)
Observe through algebraic manipulation that P (Q) − ci(g) = qi(g), which implies that
Yi(g) = qi(g) (P (Q)− ci(g)) = (qi(g))
2.
For a complete network gc, ηj(g) = n− 1 for all j. Given g
c:
qi(g
c) =
α− γ0 − f(n− 1)
n + 1
Now for a complete network missing a link (i, j), denoted as g = gc − ij, for nodes i and j,
ηi(g) = ηj(g) = n− 2 but all other nodes k have ηk(g) = n− 1. Thus:
qi(g
c − ij) =
α− γ0 + (n− 2)f(n− 1)− (n− 1)f(n− 2)
n+ 1
It follows that:
qi(g
c)− qi(g
c − ij) =
(n− 1)[f(n− 2)− f(n− 1)]
n+ 1
Since n − 1 > n − 2, Condition (1) implies f(n − 1) < f(n − 2) which implies f(n − 2) −
f(n − 1) > 0. Hence, qi(g
c) − qi(g
c − ij) > 0. By Condition (4), α − γ0 > nf(0), which
implies qi > 0 by Corollary 4.5 using fi = f . Further, since qi(g
c) + qi(g
c − ij) > 0, which
combined with qi(g
c) − qi(g
c − ij) > 0, implies Yi(g
c) − Yi(g
c − ij) > 0. This implies that
any firm i will decrease its profit by dropping link ij, hence the graph gc is stable. Now
to show that it is the only stable graph, suppose there is another graph g 6= gc that is also
stable. This implies that there exists a pair of firms (i, j) such that ij 6∈ g. Let us consider
the graph g + ij relative to the graph g.
qi(g + ij)− qi(g) =
−n
n+ 1
△f(ηi(g)) +
1
n+ 1
△f(ηj(g))
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and thus that:
Yi(g + ij)− Yi(g) = qi(g + ij)
2 − qi(g)
2 = [qi(g + ij)− qi(g)][qi(g + ij) + qi(g)]
= qi(g)
(
2
n+ 1
)
[△f(ηj(g))− n△f(ηi(g))] +
(
1
n + 1
)2
[△f(ηj(g))− n△f(ηi(g))]
2
By Condition (5), △f(ηj(g))− n△f(ηi(g)) > 0 and hence Yi(g + ij)− Yi(g) ≥ 0. Similarly,
Yj(g + ij) − Yj(g) ≥ 0, which implies that both nodes i and j may increase their profit by
linking together and so graph g is not stable. This is a contradiction and so gc is the only
stable graph. This completes the proof.
Example 4.12. We present a numerical example of Theorem 4.11. Let N = 5 firms compete
in an oligopoly with demand function P = 30−Q, fixed cost γ0 = 5, and f(ηi(g)) =
1
ηi(g)+3
.
We want to test the stability of the complete graph gc. Conditions (1)-(4) are easy to check:
1. df
dη
= −1
(ηi(g)+3)2
< 0, which implies f is decreasing;
2. d
2f
dη2
= 2
(ηi(g)+3)3
> 0, which implies that f is convex;
3. f(ηi(g)) =
1
ηi(g)+3
> 0, which implies f is positive;
4. α− γ0 = 30− 5 = 25 > nf(0) = 5
(
1
3
)
Condition (5) can be verified with the below table:
ηi(g) ηj(g) △f(ηi(g)) △f(ηj(g)) n△f(ηi(g))−△f(ηj(g)) n△f(ηj(g))−△f(ηi(g))
0 4 -0.08 -0.02 0.0059 0.4
4 0 -0.02 -0.08 0.3988 0.01
All conditions of Theorem 4.11 are met. The stability of the complete graph can be verified
exhaustively and was done using Matlab.
Remark 4.13. The functions described in Theorem 4.11 generalizes the result of Goyal and
Joshi [GJ06], since it is clear that a linear function of the vertex degrees (as assumed
in [GJ06]) will satisfy the given criteria. Furthermore, Theorem 4.7 is a further gener-
alization since we define conditions under which a collaboration graph with an arbitrary
degree distribution will be stable. This is not possible with Goyal and Joshi’s model.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we showed that networks with specific structure properties may form as a
result of game theoretic interactions. Specifically, we showed a simple way of constructing a
game whose pairwise stable solutions are those graphs with a given degree distribution. As
a particular application of network formation via game theoretic principles, we investigated
the formation of collaboration networks in oligopolistic competition. We extended the model
of Goyal and Joshi [GJ03] with a nonlinear cost function that, under particular conditions,
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admits stable collaboration graphs with an arbitrary degree sequence as well. One limitation
of this approach is that we cannot specify an exact graph structure. The degree distribution
specification generates a class of stable graphs rather than a single graph. We do not view
this as a problem since it can help explain variation in observed situations with the same
parameters.
5.1 Potential Relation to Network Science
Special structure in networks has been considered in several recent papers [BA99, New03,
DM02,AB02], that have cut across various subjects including social networks, information
networks, and biological networks as well as physical networks such as power grids and
road networks. A review of networks in these disciplines may be found in various articles
(see [New03,DM02,AB02] and the references therein).
The network science literature was largely inspired by the observation of macroscopic
structural properties (e.g., small world, power law degree distribution) of networks that
occurred in several distinct network types (e.g., social, information, biological networks),
which have diverse microscopic properties. The network science literature has largely been
devoted to finding the mechanisms by which networks form and/or evolve in order to generate
the structural properties that are observed. The momentum in this direction has largely
been driven by the statistical physics community [BA99, New03, DM02], who argue that
the phenomena of complex networks (e.g., power laws) may be explained by laws that reach
across all complex networks because they are phenomena that are inherent to the complexity
of the networks.
Alternatively, there has been recent interest in the structural properties of networks
that have been designed via optimization [Ald08, Nag08, ADGW03]. This perspective is
motivated largely by the fact that many networks (in the abstract sense) are models for
physical networks that are designed by humans to function with particular objectives (or
even designed by nature to serve an evolutionary purpose). These networks are distinctly
different from social networks, which are abstract models that describe interactions between
actors (e.g., people talking, writing scientific papers or dating). These networks (e.g., power
grids, communication networks) are not designed through central coordination, but arise as
a result of the objectives of multiple independent actors. As a result there are structural
properties that often exist in these networks that are not explained by models that do not
account for these functioning characteristics [DAL+05].
The work presented in this paper is motivated by this new work. Our perspective is
that some networks are formed as a result of the interacting strategies of multiple players,
rather than a universal rule for network formation. This is consistent with certain recent
observations on (e.g.) power law networks [SP12]. This occurs in collaboration networks.
The formation of the collaboration network results from the strategic decisions of the players.
The network will still have particular structural properties that are explained via game
theoretic principles. In this paper, we illustrated that an important property to the Network
Science community, namely the degree distribution, can emerge as a result of designed game
mechanism. As an explanatory model, we suggest that certain networks with interesting
21
degree distributions form as a result of strategic player interactions in which each node degree
in embedded (or hidden) in the objective function of the node player. The formulation in
this paper is simply an explicit representation. In [LGF11] we illustrate a class of games
that generate specific degree distributions in which the degree is not an explicit part of the
objective functions of the players.
6 Future Directions
There are several directions this research could take. In [LGF11] we begin the investigation
of graph formation games with specific link bias and identify a game theoretic mechanism
that does not explicitly encode the degree distribution of interest into the players’ objective
functions and yet is still capable of having graphs with arbitrary degree distributions as stable
solutions. This work is extended in [LFG12]. We also investigate the graph formation game
in the presence of spatial oligopolies in [LFG11]. Clearly investigating the mechanism design
problem for additional graph properties, such as the clustering coefficient is of interest.
Recent work on generation of graphs with specific clustering coefficients [GRKF11] may
provide insight into game theoretic mechanisms for solving the same problem.
Another equally interesting future direction lies in the extraction of game theoretic mech-
anisms from real-world data. Solving such a problem may take two forms. In the first form,
small real world human networks are evaluated using traditional psycho-social interview-
ing techniques in an attempt to identify objective functions or constraints consistent with
the model presented in this paper and theoretical extensions (e.g., [LFG12]). This work is
planned in collaboration with social psychologists at the authors’ parent institution. A sec-
ond form of objective function inference would be completely observational in which, given
a network that appeared to be stable, one would attempt to infer the set of potential objec-
tive functions (and player constraints [LGF11]) that would generate the given stable graph.
Observation of network evolution would also be useful. In this case, statistical techniques
would have to be applied to the determination of the objective function structure.
A final direction of investigation lies in the evaluation of dynamic network formation.
That is, investigating this problem in a dynamic context in which the objective functions of
players may change. We propose that this problem can be analyzed in discrete time using
techniques from competitive Markov decision theory [JAF97]. However, the combinatorial
properties of the graph structures (for all but the simplest networks) make a brute force anal-
ysis approach intractable. Thus a more sophisticated analysis technique may be necessary
to obtain any useful results.
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